You will need to apply this patch in order for the interactive tests to function as without it the secure part will never build with that part enabled https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/tf-m-tests/+/9431
After applying that and building using:

cmake -DTFM_PLATFORM=lairdconnectivity/bl5340_dvk_cpuapp -GNinja -DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../toolchain_GNUARM.cmake -DTEST_S=off -DTEST_NS=on -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=debug -DTFM_INTERACTIVE_TEST=on -DTFM_PERIPH_ACCESS_TEST=ON -DTFM_IRQ_TEST=ON ..

And running it, the first test passes but the freezes at the same point as yours does, it does not continue with the next task

I took a look at this test case, the interactive test suit is disabled by default. Could you append some logs or command on your platform of TFM_CORE_TEST_2001
The test from my side on AN521 will stop after scenario 1:

Executing 'TFM_CORE_TEST_2001'

Description: 'Interactive tests'

Scenario 1 - SequentialTrying to acquire the TFM core from NS [seq_task]NS Lock: acquired [seq_task]Secure call to tfm_spm_core_test_sfn_veneer(&in_vec, 1, NULL, 0) failed, generic!NS Lock: releasing... [seq_task]Scenario 1 - test finished

If the NSPE can use all the ARMv8-M processors, then it makes sense to use a model similar to ARMv8-A. In that model, the request for a secure service is usually handled by the local core - no cross core interaction.

Imo, the implementation can be very platform specific. It is required that the two cores shall be physically isolated.
Besides, when NS requires secure services on the other core, the other core must runs in S world. It is a bit difficult to guarantee.

The concept I am working on would allow for execution of two NS environments both with access to TF-M services. The goal is also to isolate the NS environments from one another to provide safety in case of failure / maliciousness of one NS env. But this safety feature is not necessary for the use case of two Cortex M-33 with NS + TF-M.

@oyvind.ronningstad@nordicsemi.no This issue is on the Nordic platform. Can you take a look at it?

Assigned to Ken for the warning fix.

@MartinSchoenstedt so are you trying to run Non-secure OS + TF-M on both MPS2 AN521 cores?
Are you designing a SMP (symmetric multiprocessing) system for both NS and S? May I know the benefit to run NS + TF-M on both cores, compared to running a single Cortex-M33?

I solved this issue by myself.
The assert state works normally.

Yes this was indeed what I was thinking about. I am now trying to modify the secure enclave implementation to work with both CPUs in the SSE 200 on the MPS2 AN521 image. This would also also both cores to still be used by nonsecure OS / applications

Hi David. What about a scenario where non-secure applications want to use both cores? I think this is what Martin is asking about. Dedicating one M33 to act as a secure enclave can be considered a waste of compute resource (it will be idle most of the time).

I will run the GCC version later to check if there are more warnings. Will collect all the warnings and fix them in one shot later.

Makes sense :)
Here is the GCC version output:

$arm-zephyr-eabi-gcc --version
arm-zephyr-eabi-gcc (crosstool-NG 1.24.0.212_d7da3a9) 10.2.0
Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

It looks like your compiler is bit more stricter than mine :)
It won't take too much to effort to fix those warnings I guess.

Can you share the Compiler information please?

Hi Martin, this *dual-cpu* design is dedicated for the platforms which consist of a non-secure core and a secure core. The secure core is protected from the non-secure core by system physical isolation. PSoC 64 is an example port of this *dual-cpu* implementation.

Don't know where to ask this, current TF-M design allows only for one secure cpu and one non-secure?
Why not have SPE and NSPE on both cores, as would be possible on mps2/an521 e.g. (dual M-33 with TrustZone). Could TF-M be modified to allow for such a behavior in the current version?
Thankful for any answers!

Improved by https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/9451

Great suggestion. Will add one in build configuration check soon.

I see. It would be good to have an error message in that case.

Profile Medium selects IPC model by default. TF-M IPC model disables audit log service since audit log doesn't implement IPC model interface yet.
Please see: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/config/tfm_ipc_config_default.cmake

TF-M audit log service doesn't implement IPC model interface. Therefore it is not enabled by default in IPC model.
IPC model default configuration disables TF-M audit log. Please see: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/config/tfm_ipc_config_default.cmake

Hi Olivier,

Raghu as you are originator for this ask; can you state more about the requirements as to the why we'd really need to do so?

Fix is merged to integration and master. (https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TS/trusted-services.git/commit/?h=refs/heads/main&id=840696b9ac1ba6aa9ccd024ca9dc3b4be12bf837)

Submitted for review at https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/tf-m-tests/+/9431

With a recent version of QEMU (i.e. 4.x), it should be enough just to use this to run TF-M on QEMU for AN521:

Fix is on review here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TS/trusted-services/+/9379

The fix is merged: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/tf-m-tests/+/8178

That's not currently supported.

I think it would be reasonable if Hafnium implements this feature when there is an explicit request for it from a Trusted OS or SP vendor. In the meantime, Hafnium returning INVALID_PARAMETERS sounds like a reasonable approach to me. It implies that the ACK test can be ignored. What do you reckon?

FWIW, agree with Olivier's analysis.

That's a very interesting definition of reproducible.

Blocked by https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T901

After the initial investigation I found two possible approaches to the task:

Yes, we include a prebuilt toolchain so that the builds are reproducible. It's a copy of the Android prebuilt toolchain (from https://android.googlesource.com/platform/prebuilts/clang/host/linux-x86/), which I'm afraid doesn't seem to include aarch64 binaries at the moment.

In particular this is about specifying the offset field in the endpoint memory access descriptor.

The possible envisioned scenario is related to booting TF-A+UEFI and support for authenticated variables.

Revert patch:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/9142

Workaround from CI to skip the Clang + FF + Debug for Musca B1:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/ci/tf-m-ci-scripts/+/9286